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Introduction
In response to the perfect storm of falling stock 
returns and interest rates that hit pension funds in 
2000, many companies in the United States and the 
United Kingdom have shifted from defined benefit 
(DB) to defined contribution (DC) schemes.  In 
contrast, Dutch pension plans have mainly preserved 
their defined benefit character in recent years, al-
though they have switched from “final-pay” to “aver-
age-wage” schemes.  The average-wage plans may 
be better viewed as hybrid DB-DC schemes.  They 
are like DB plans in that accrued pension rights are 
based on an employee’s wages and years of service, 
and contribution rates can be raised in response to a 
funding shortfall.  They are like DC plans in that the 
annual indexation factor, which is applied to both the 
accrued rights of active workers and the benefits of 
retired workers, is tied to the fund’s financial status 
and, therefore, investment returns.  As a result, these 
hybrid plans have two mechanisms — contribution 
rates and indexation — to control solvency risk, effec-
tively minimizing the risk of under-funding.   
Overview of the Dutch 
Pension System
As in most developed countries, the Dutch pension 
system has three pillars.  The first is the public pen-
sion scheme, which offers a basic flat-rate pension to 
all retirees that is financed on a pay-as-you-go basis.   
The second pillar — which is the focus of this brief 
— is the employer-based supplementary scheme, 
which provides retirees with earnings-related income 
and covers 90 percent of the labor force.  The third 
pillar is personal savings.
The Netherlands’ supplementary pension sys-
tem mainly consists of funded DB plans.  Benefits 
are determined by years of service and a reference 
wage, which can be final pay or the average wage 
over the years of service.  The benefit formula takes 
into account the retirement benefits from the public 
scheme.  In the postwar period, the plans primarily 
were structured as final-pay plans.  Many pension 
funds aimed at a total benefit — including the public 
pension — of 70 percent of the final wage.  This 
maximum will usually be reached after 40 years of 
service, as the typical accrual rate is 1.75 percent.  In 
recent years, many pension funds have switched from 
final-pay plans to average-wage plans. 
In an average-wage plan, individuals accrue pen-
sion rights annually based on the salary earned in 
each year of their working life (rather than the final 
year, as in a final-pay plan).  Earnings are usually 
re-valued upwards (or indexed) each year to take ac-
count of inflation or wage growth.  The accrual rate 
is 2 percent or even higher, because a total pension 
equal to 80 percent of the average wage generally cor-
responds to 70 percent of final pay.  After retirement, 
benefits are mostly inflation-indexed or wage-indexed. 
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An important feature of an average-wage plan is that 
the level of indexation in any given year depends on 
the financial position of the pension fund.
By law, pension promises made to employees 
must be funded.  Furthermore, the assets of DB plans 
have to be held within a separate trust, usually orga-
nized as a pension fund.  The Netherlands has three 
types of pension funds:  1) industry; 2) company; and 
3) occupational.  The industry pension fund is orga-
nized for a specific branch of industry (e.g., construc-
tion, health care) and participation is mandatory for 
all firms in the branch.  A company can opt out only 
if it establishes a company pension fund that offers a 
better plan to its employees than the industry plan.  
For both company and industry funds, participation 
by workers is generally mandatory and governed by 
collective labor agreements.  An occupational pension 
fund is organized for a specific group of professionals, 
like physicians.
Industry funds hold two-thirds of the system’s 
total assets of 637 billion euros (end of 2005); and 
they cover almost 85 percent of plan participants (see 
Figure 1).1  Company pension funds encompass 30 
percent of the remaining assets and 15 percent of 
the plan participants.  The few occupational pension 
funds are mostly very small. 
 At the beginning of this century, pension funds 
in the Netherlands, as elsewhere, were hit by a perfect 
storm, characterized by a fall in assets due to a sharp 
decline in equity markets and an increase in liabilities 
due to a drop in interest rates to historic low levels.2  
As a result, the funding ratios fell sharply.  In addi-
tion, at this time Dutch pension plans adopted a new 
Figure 1. Pension Funds in the Netherlands by 
Assets and Active Participants, 2005
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Figure 2. Percent of Active Participants in 
Defined Benefit Plans by Type, 1998-2005










Hybrid Character of Today’s 
Dutch Pension Funds
Official statistics classify average-wage funds as DB 
schemes.  However, a typical characteristic of these 
schemes is that indexation of all accrued liabilities is 
dependent on the solvency position of the pension 
fund through a so-called “policy ladder.”  A policy 
ladder explicitly relates the contribution and index-
ation policies to the financial position of the pension 
fund.4   
For example — in the case of indexation policy     
if the fund is below its solvency target in a given year, 
accounting method using “fair-value” principles that 
has had the effect of making underfunding problems 
more visible.  In reaction to the sharp drop in pension 
funding, the Dutch government imposed strict new 
funding requirements in 2002. 
As shown in Figure 2, the predominant reaction 
by Dutch pension funds after 2001 was to switch 
from DB-final-pay plans to DB-average-wage plans.  
Between 1998 and 2005, the share of all active partici-
pants covered by average-wage plans jumped from 
one-quarter to three-quarters.  In contrast, while DC 
plans also grew during this period, they only covered 
6 percent of active participants in 2005.  This trend 
contrasts with the experience in the United States and 
the United Kingdom, where the perfect storm acceler-
ated the switch from DB to DC plans.3  
—Issue in Brief 3
the indexation rate for that year will be less than the 
growth rate of the relevant index.  For example, say 
that wages grow by 4 percent.  The indexation fac-
tor might be set at only three-quarters of the wage 
growth rate (i.e., 3 percent rather than 4 percent).  In 
this case, retirees would see their benefits rise by 3 
percent.  And active workers would see their wages 
adjusted by 3 percent for the purposes of calculat-
ing their earned pension rights for that year.  On the 
other hand, when pension plans are well funded, this 
process can work in reverse — the pension fund can 
“over-index” to catch up for prior years in which work-
ers received less than full indexation.5
In contrast, under a traditional DB plan, accrued 
liabilities are always fully indexed for wage growth, 
and the contribution rate is adjusted to absorb a 
funding surplus or shortfall.  At the other end of the 
continuum is what may be called a collective DC plan, 
wherein the contribution rate is fixed and only the 
indexation rate is adjusted.  Reflecting their hybrid 
nature, most Dutch pension funds are somewhere in 
between these two approaches.  According to agreed 
upon rules, fund managers can adjust both the in-
dexation rate and contribution rate simultaneously to 
absorb a surplus or shortfall.
The practice of solvency-contingent indexation 
implies that the final pension result will be partly 
dependent on investment returns.  The current 
typical average-wage scheme can therefore better be 
described as a hybrid DB-DC plan, keeping a midway 
position between a traditional DB plan — with flex-
ible contributions and well-defined indexed pensions 
— and a DC plan — with uncertain benefits and well-
defined contributions. 
Effect of Pension Plan Design 
on Risk 
Pension-plan design determines how risk is allocated 
among stakeholders.  An Asset-Liability Management 
framework can be used to compare the allocation 
of risk among the plan members in a typical aver-
age-wage plan to both a traditional DB plan and a 
collective DC plan.  This framework relies on stylized 
examples of each plan and uses an economic model 
to study how the plans fare under a wide variety of 
outcomes for key variables, such as asset returns and 
inflation.6  The analysis summarized here assumes 
that the asset mix is the same for the three variants, 
so the total risk to be distributed is also the same.  But 
the variants differ in the way in which risk is allocated 
among the stakeholders.  Table 1 summarizes how the 
three plan types compare under three different risk 
measures over a projection period of 2006-2025.  
The first measure is the average annual change in 
the contribution rate (column 1).  The results show 
that a traditional DB plan would typically require 
contribution rate increases of 3.2 percent per year to 
maintain its funding status compared to 2.6 percent 
per year for the hybrid plan.  (The collective DC plan 
maintains a fixed contribution rate).  The second mea-
sure is the cumulative deviation from full indexation 
(column 2).  Here, the collective DC plan has the 
greatest risk, with a 15 percent chance that indexation 
would be less than 80 percent of full indexation com-
pared to 9 percent in the hybrid plan.  (The traditional 
DB plan always provides full indexation).  The third 
measure is the probability of nominal under-funding 
(column 3).  In this case, the traditional DB plan has 
the highest risk, with an 11 percent chance of nominal 
under-funding at the end of the period.
This analysis clarifies the various trade-offs in pen-
sion-plan design.  Full indexation in the traditional 
DB plan comes at the cost of both a higher risk of 
under-funding and a more volatile contribution rate. 
The fixed contribution rate in a collective DC plan 
comes mainly at the cost of high indexation risk.7  
The current hybrid plan takes a midway position, with 
some volatility in both the contribution rate and the 
level of indexation.  What is gained in the hybrid plan 
is less chance of under-funding compared to either a 
traditional DB plan or a collective DC plan. 
Table 1. Risk Characteristics by Plan Type, 2006-
2025
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Hoevenaars and 
Ponds (2007).
Traditional DB 3.2 0 11
Collective DC 0 15 5
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Probability ofon the solvency position of the pension fund.  Thus, 
in principle, pension funds could have invoked this 
possibility and shifted investment risk to pensioners.  
Given the maturity of most funds, such a shift would 
have presented an effective instrument for restoring 
solvency.  However, this approach would have been 
difficult as the conditional indexation of pension ben-
efits had been poorly communicated to participants.  
Moreover, the clauses had been seldom invoked, as 
the financial situation of most funds was healthy 
or was considered to be so under the old actuarial 
framework for valuing pension liabilities.  As a con-
sequence, strong resistance from pensioners might 
have been expected.  Pensioners might have felt that 
they were the victim of contribution holidays in the 
roaring 1990s, and they threatened to go to court in 
case pension funds decided to shift the risk only to 
them.  A way out was to broaden solvency-contingent 
indexation to all liabilities — including accrued rights 
of active members.  Technically, this implied a switch 
from final-wage plans to solvency-contingent average-
wage plans.      
Contrast with the US and UK 
Response 
Dutch pension funds are independent financial 
institutions with their own governance and adminis-
trative structure separate from that of the employers.8 
Therefore, they argue that risk-sharing is spread more 
broadly, that the funds and not employers are re-
sponsible for correcting situations of under-funding.  
Their status as a separate trust gives pension funds a 
significant degree of operational autonomy that is not 
always present in the Anglo-Saxon trust model.9 
Employers and unions are equally represented on 
Dutch pension fund boards.  Thus, in contrast to the 
Anglo-Saxon DB plans, Dutch employers are less able 
to dominate and direct pension fund management 
and policy, and therefore must compromise more 
with unions.  The other side of the coin, however, is 
that they also are not regarded as exclusively responsi-
ble for correcting situations related to under-funding 
and risk-bearing.  This contrast is accentuated by the 
dominance in the Netherlands of industry pension 
funds, which are rare in the Anglo-Saxon world. 
Individual DC elements in pension plans are virtually 
absent within industry pension funds, and risk-shar-
ing is still predominantly done collectively. 
This difference in the government and regulation 
of pension funds goes a long way toward explain-
ing why the United States and the United Kingdom 
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Reason for the Switch in 
Dutch Pension Funds
Traditionally, risk management by Dutch pension 
funds in the postwar period was done primarily by 
adjustments in the contribution rate.  As noted, the 
current hybrid plan structure uses adjustments in 
both contributions and indexation, which seems to 
reflect a compromise between the various stakehold-
ers.  The question is how this switch occurred and 
why the Dutch experience is so different from that of 
the United States and the United Kingdom. 
Constraints on Higher Contribution 
Rates 
After 2000, awareness grew that risk management 
through contribution rates exclusively was no longer 
appropriate.  First, most Dutch pension funds have 
a relatively high and rising ratio of pensioners to 
workers.  As a result, the ratio of liabilities to total 
wages is expected to rise from about 2.5 today to 4.5 
in 2030.  This sharp increase will severely undermine 
the effectiveness of the contribution rate as a steer-
ing instrument.  To improve the funding ratio by 1 
percent would require an additional contribution of 
4.5 percent in the future, instead of the 2.5 percent in 
the present.
For employers, it was important to address this 
declining effectiveness of the contribution rate and to 
spread risks more evenly over participants and spon-
sors.  But this issue was also a concern for unions. 
Unions in the Netherlands have to strike an internal 
compromise between the interests of younger work-
ers and the interests of older workers and pensioners 
(who often retain their  union membership).  In most 
cases, moreover, union representatives on pension 
boards are often closely involved in wage negotiations. 
This involvement explains why unions have been 
willing to spread risks more broadly between active 
members and pensioners.  An exclusive reliance on 
contribution rates to absorb risks would run the risk 
of alienating younger workers and put a heavy burden 
on wage negotiations, as employers would try to shift 
pension costs to workers.       
Constraints on Lower Indexation of 
Benefits 
In most final-wage pension plans, indexation of 
pension benefits was, at least on paper, dependent Issue in Brief 5
have witnessed a stronger shift to individual DC 
schemes (where employers have shifted risks to their 
employees), while in the Netherlands risk-sharing is 
both collective and spread more evenly among vari-
ous stakeholders.  Additionally, the role of unions as 
agents of social solidarity has remained important 
in the Netherlands.  This situation contrasts sharply 
with that in the United States, where the demise of 
DB plans seems to be related to the decline of union-
ism. 
The unions’ concern for social solidarity is broadly 
supported in Dutch society.  A shift to individual 
pension provision, as in the United Kingdom and the 
United States, is not on the Dutch political agenda. 
Surveys show that most people prefer collective 
risk-sharing over individual DC plans with greater 
investor autonomy, and that there is a high degree 
of household confidence in the current pension 
scheme.10  The willingness to share risk collectively 
and to accept its possible distributional consequences 
presupposes a certain degree of societal trust.  Indeed, 
studies show a relatively high degree of social trust in 
the Netherlands and relatively low levels in the United 
States and United Kingdom, which are characterized 
by a more conservative political culture.11  
Conclusion
The hybrid pension plans that have evolved in the 
Netherlands offer a promising way to balance risk 
between employers, active workers, and retirees.  Go-
ing forward, the current hybrid schemes will likely 
evolve towards collective DC pension plans.  This 
shift may also be accompanied by more flexibility in 
risk exposure for younger and older members.  Such 
flexibility would allow younger members to bear more 
risk in exchange for the prospect of higher returns 
and older members to bear less risk in exchange for 
more certainty in the indexation of their benefits.  In 
any case, unlike in the Anglo-Saxon countries, collec-
tive risk-sharing will remain an important element in 
Dutch pension funds.Center for Retirement Research 6
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Endnotes
1  Among these are two giant funds: the pension fund 
for civil servants (APB) and the pension fund for 
heath care employees (PGGM).  Together, these funds 
cover almost 30 percent of all active members and 40 
percent of total assets under management.
2  Boeri, et al. (2006).
3  Munnell (2006).
4  See Ponds and van Riel (2007) for a more detailed 
description of the policy ladder mechanism.
 
5  When assets fall short of the value of nominal li-
abilities, there is no indexation at all.  When the value 
of the assets is between the nominal and real liabili-
ties, indexation will be partial proportionally to the 
overfunding above nominal liabilities.  When assets 
are in excess of real liabilities, catch-up indexation of 
previously missed indexation will be given.
6  See Ponds and van Riel (2007) for further details.
7  A similar exercise, described in detail in Ponds and 
van Riel (2006), shows that indexation risks increase 
in an individual DC plan, such as the 401(k) plan 
that is widely used in the United States.  Moreover, in 
contrast to the plans in Table 1, an individual DC plan 
does not cover longevity risks.
8  Laboul and Yermo (2006).
9  Laboul and Yermo (2006).
10  Van Rooij, Kool, and Prast (2007).
11  Dekker and van den Broek (2005).About the Center
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